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المراجع

الفصل الأول: مقدمة وتاريخ

  • Chomsky, N. (1959). A review of B. F. Skinner’s Verbal behavior. Language, 35, 25–58.
  • Galton, F. (1893). Inquiries into human faculty and its development. London: Macmillan.
  • Hall, C. (1954/1999). A primer of Freudian psychology. New York: Penguin.
  • James, W. (1890/2007). The principles of psychology. New York: Cosimo.
  • Mandler, G. (2006). A history of modern experimental psychology: From James and Wundt to cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Nisbett, R. E., and Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84, 231–95.
  • Singh, S. (2010). The code book: The secret history of codes and code breaking. London: Fourth Estate.
  • Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
  • Watson, J. B. (1913). Psychology as the behaviorist sees it. Psychological Review, 20, 158–77.
  • Winters, B., et al. (2012). Diagnostic errors in the intensive care unit: a systematic review of autopsy studies. British Medical Journal Quality & Safety, 21, 894–902.

الفصل الثاني: حل المشكلات

  • Duncker, K. (1945). On problem solving. Psychological Monographs, 58, No. 270, 1–113.
  • Evans, J. St. B. T., and Stanovich, K. E. (2013). Dual process theories of higher cognition: Advancing the debate. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8, 223–41.
  • Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19, 25–42.
  • Gick, M. L., and Holyoak, K. J. (1980). Analogical problem solving. Cognitive Psychology, 12, 306–55.
  • Gilhooly, K. J., Ball, L. J., and Macchi, L. (Eds) (2015). Creativity and insight in problem solving. Special issue of Thinking & Reasoning, 21 (1). Abingdon: Taylor and Francis.
  • Kasparov, G. (2011). Kasparov on Kasparov, Part 1. Guildford, CT: Everyman.
  • Klein, G. (1998). Sources of power. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Mithen, S. (1996). The prehistory of the mind. London: Thames & Hudson.
  • Newell, A., and Simon, H. A. (1972). Human problem solving. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
  • Robertson, S. I. (2001). Problem solving. Hove: Psychology Press.
  • Wertheimer, M. (1961). Productive thinking. London: Tavistock.

الفصل الثالث: التفكير الافتراضي

  • Byrne, R. M. J. (2005). The rational imagination. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Evans, J. St. B. T. (2016). A brief history of the Wason selection task. In N. Galbraith (Ed.), The thinking mind: A festschrift for Ken Manktelow (pp. 1–14). Hove: Psychology Press.
  • Evans, J. St. B. T. (2016). Reasoning, biases and dual processes: The lasting impact of Wason (I960). Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 69, 2076–92.
  • Evans, J. St. B. T., and Over, D. E. (2004). If. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Fugelsang, J. A., Stein, C. B., Green, A. E., and Dunbar, K. N. (2004). Theory and data interactions of the scientific mind: Evidence from the molecular and cognitive laboratory. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58, 86–95.
  • Lucas, E. J., and Ball, L. J. (2005). Think-aloud protocols and the selection task: Evidence for relevance effects and rationalisation processes. Thinking and Reasoning, 11, 35–66.
  • Sloman, S. A. (2005). Causal models. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Wagenaar, W. A. (1988). Paradoxes of gambling behaviour. Hove and London: Erlbaum.
  • Wason, P. C., and Evans, J. St. B. T. (1975). Dual processes in reasoning? Cognition, 3, 141–54.
  • White, P. A. (2003). Causal judgement as evaluation of evidence: The use of confirmatory and disconfirmatory information. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 56A, 491–513.

الفصل الرابع: اتخاذ القرارات

  • Baron, J., and Ritov, I. (2004). Omission bias, individual differences, and normality. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 94, 74–85.
  • Bueler, R., Griffin, D., and Ross, M. (2002). Inside the planning fallacy: The causes and consequences of optimistic time predictions. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, and D. Kahneman (Eds), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgement (pp. 250–70). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Evans, J. St. B. T. (2007). Hypothetical thinking: Dual processes in reasoning and judgement. Hove: Psychology Press.
  • Gigerenzer, G. (2007). Gut feelings: The intelligence of the unconscious. London: Penguin.
  • Gigerenzer, G., and Todd, P. M. (1999). Fast and frugal heuristics: The adaptive toolbox. In G. Gigerenzer, P. M. Todd, and ABC Research Group (Eds), Simple heuristics that make us smart (pp. 3–36). New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., and Kahneman, D. (2002). Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Griffin, D., and Tversky, A. (1992). The weighting of evidence and the determinants of confidence. Cognitive Psychology, 24, 411–35.
  • Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263–91.
  • Raylu, N., and Oci, T. P. S. (2002). Pathological gambling: A comprehensive review. Clinical Psychology Review, 22, 1009–61.
  • Shafir, E., Simenson, I., and Tversky, A. (1993). Reason-based choice. Cognition, 49, 11–36.
  • Soman, D. (2005). Framing, loss aversion and mental accounting. In D. J. Koehler and N. Harvey (Eds), Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision making (pp. 379–98). Oxford: Blackwell.
  • Tversky, A., and Kahneman, A. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297–323.

الفصل الخامس: الاستدلال

  • Barbey, A. K., and Sloman, S. A. (2007). Base-rate respect: From ecological validity to dual processes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 241–97.
  • Braine, M. D. S., and O’Brien, D. P. (Eds) (1998). Mental logic. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
  • Byrne, R. M. J. (1991). Can valid inferences be suppressed? Cognition, 39, 71–8.
  • Cascells, W., Schoenburger, A., and Graboys, T. B. (1978). Interpretation by physicians of clinical laboratory results. New England Journal of Medicine, 299, 999–1001.
  • Cosmides, L., and Tooby, J. (1996). Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all? Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgment under uncertainty. Cognition, 58, 1–73.
  • Edgington, D. (2003). What if? Questions about conditionals. Mind & Language, 18, 380–401.
  • Evans, J. St. B. T. (2002). Logic and human reasoning: An assessment of the deduction paradigm. Psychological Bulletin, 128, 978–96.
  • Evans, J. St. B. T., Barston, J. L., and Pollard, P. (1983). On the conflict between logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning. Memory & Cognition, 11, 295–306.
  • Evans, J. St. B. T., Handley, S. J., Harper, C., and Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1999). Reasoning about necessity and possibility: A test of the mental model debate. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 25, 1495–513.
  • Gigerenzer, G. (2002). Reckoning with risk. London: Penguin Books.
  • Howson, C., and Urbach, P. (2006). Scientific reasoning: The Bayesian approach (3rd edition). Chicago: Open Court.
  • Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983). Mental models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Johnson-Laird, P. N., and Savary, F. (1999). Illusory inferences: A novel class of erroneous deductions. Cognition, 71, 191–299.
  • Klauer, K. C., Musch, J., and Naumer, B. (2000). On belief bias in syllogistic reasoning. Psychological Review, 107, 852–84.
  • Oaksford, M., and Chater, N. (2007). Bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Over, D. E., Hadjichristidis, C., Evans, J. St. B. T., Handley, S. J., and Sloman, S. A. (2007). The probability of causal conditionals. Cognitive Psychology, 54, 62–97.

الفصل السادس: هل نحن عقلانيون؟

  • Anderson, J. R. (1990). The adaptive character of thought. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
  • Barkow, J. H., Cosmides, L., and Tooby, J. (Eds) (1992). The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Cohen, L. J. (1981). Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4, 317–70.
  • Cosmides, L. (1989). The logic of social exchange: Has natural selection shaped how humans reason? Cognition, 31, 187–276.
  • Cosmides, L., and Tooby, J. (1996). Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all? Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgment under uncertainty. Cognition, 58, 1–73.
  • Elqayam, S., and Evans, J. St. B. T. (2011). Subtracting ‘ought’ from ‘is’: Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34, 233–90.
  • Evans, J. St. B. T. (2007). Hypothetical thinking: Dual processes in reasoning and judgement. Hove: Psychology Press.
  • Evans, J. St. B. T., and Over, D. E. (1996). Rationality and reasoning. Hove: Psychology Press.
  • Fiddick, L., Cosmides, L., and Tooby, J. (2000). No interpretation without representation: The role of domain-specific representations and inferences in the Wason selection task. Cognition, 77, 1–79.
  • Fodor, J. (1983). The modularity of mind. Scranton, PA: Crowell.
  • Fodor, J. (2001). The mind doesn’t work that way. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Gigerenzer, G. (2002). Reckoning with risk. London: Penguin Books.
  • Gigerenzer, G. (2007). Gut feelings: The intelligence of the unconscious. London: Penguin.
  • Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. M., and ABC Research Group (1999). Simple heuristics that make us smart. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Manktelow, K. I., and Over, D. E. (1991). Social roles and utilities in reasoning with deontic conditionals. Cognition, 39, 85–105.
  • Oaksford, M., and Chater, N. (1994). A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection. Psychological Review, 101, 608–31.
  • Oaksford, M., and Chater, N. (2007). Bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Poletiek, F. (2001). Hypothesis-testing behaviour. Hove: Psychology Press.
  • Stanovich, K. E. (2011). Rationality and the reflective mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Stanovich, K. E., West, R. W., and Toplack, M. E. (2016). The rationality quotient: Towards a test of rational thinking. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

الفصل السابع: من نظرية المُعالجة المزدوجة إلى نظرية العقلَين

  • Baddeley, A. (2007). Working memory, thought and action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Colom, R., Rebollo, I., Palacios, A., Juan-Espinosa, M., and Kyllonen, P. C. (2004). Working memory is (almost) perfectly predicted by g. Intelligence, 32 (3), 277–96.
  • De Neys, W. (2012). Bias and conflict: A case for logical intuitions. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 28–38.
  • Evans, J. St. B. T. (2007). Hypothetical thinking: Dual processes in reasoning and judgement. Hove: Psychology Press.
  • Evans, J. St. B. T. (2010). Thinking twice: Two minds in one brain. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Evans, J. St. B. T., and Stanovich, K. E. (2013). Dual process theories of higher cognition: Advancing the debate. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8, 223–41.
  • Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19, 25–42.
  • Gladwell, M. (2005). Blink. London: Penguin.
  • Handley, S. J., Newstead, S. E., and Trippas, D. (2011). Logic, beliefs, and instruction: A test of the default interventionist account of belief bias. Journal of Experimental Psychology-Learning Memory and Cognition, 37, 28–43.
  • Keren, G., and Schul, Y. (2009). Two is not always better than one: A critical evaluation of two-system theories. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4, 533–50.
  • Klein, G. (1998). Sources of power. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Kruglanski, A. W., and Gigerenzer, G. (2011). Intuitive and deliberative judgements are based on common principles. Psychological Review, 118, 97–109.
  • Mithen, S. (1996). The prehistory of the mind. London: Thames & Hudson.
  • Reber, A. S. (1993). Implicit learning and tacit knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 3–22.
  • Smith, E., and DeCoster, J. (2000). Dual-process models in social and cognitive psychology: Conceptual integration and links to underlying memory systems. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4, 108–31.
  • Stanovich, K. E. (2011). Rationality and the reflective mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Toates, F. (2006). A model of the hierarchy of behaviour, cognition and consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 15, 75–118.
  • Thompson, V. A., Prowse Turner, J. A., and Pennycook, G. (2011). Intuition, reason, and metacognition. Cognitive Psychology, 63, 107–40.
  • Wilson, T. D. (2002). Strangers to ourselves. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
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