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المراجع

المراجع بالإنجليزية Bibliography

A

  • Anderson, A. R. (ed.) (1964) Minds and Machines, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
  • Armstrong, D. M. (1968) A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
  • Armstrong, D. M. (1989) Universals: An Opinionated Introduction, Boulder: Westview Press.

B

  • Bacon, J., Campbell, K., and Reinhardt, L. (eds) (1992) Ontology, Causality, and Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Baker, Lynne Rudder (1987) Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Barnes, J. (1987) Early Greek Philosophy, London: Penguin.
  • Berkeley, George (1710/1979) Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous ed. Robert M. Adams, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.
  • Berkeley, George (1713/1983) Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, ed. Kenneth Winkler, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.
  • Blackburn, Simon (1990) “Filling in Space,” Analysis 50: 62–5.
  • Blakeslee, Sandra (1996) “The Brain in the Gut,” New York Times (Science Times), Tuesday, 23 January, B5 and B10.
  • Block, Ned (1978) “Troubles with Functionalism,” in C. W. Savage (ed) Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of Psychology (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 261–325. Reprinted in Block (1980a): 268–305; and in Rosenthal, 28–211: (1991)
  • Block, Ned (ed.) (1980a) Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
  • Block, Ned (1980b) “What is Functionalism,” in Block (1980a): 171–84.
  • Boghossian, Paul A. (1990) “The Status of Content,” The Philosophical Review. 84–99: 157
  • Broad, C. D. (1925) The Mind and Its Place in Nature, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
  • Burge, Tyler (1979) “Individualism and the Mental,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73–121.
  • Burge, Tyler (1986) “Individualism and Psychology,” Philosophical Review 45: 3, 45-Reprinted in Rosenthal (1991): 536–67.

C

  • Chalmers, David (1996) The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Chalmers, David and Searle, John (1997) “Consciousness and the Philosophers: An Exchange,” New York Review of Books, 15 May: 60-1.
  • Cheney, D. L. and Seyfarth, R. M. (1990) How Monkeys See the World: Inside the Mind of Another Species, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  • Cheney, D. L. and Seyfarth, R. M. (1992) “Précis of How Monkeys See the World: Inside the Mind of Another Species,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15: 135–82.
  • Chomsky, Noam (1959) “Review of Verbal Behavior,” Language 35: 26–58.
  • Chomsky, Noam (1966) Cartesian Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Rationalist Thought, New York: Harper and Row.
  • Churchland, Patricia (1986) Neurophilosophy, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
  • Churchland, Paul (1979) Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Churchland, Paul (1981) “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes,” Journal of Philosophy 78: 67–90, Reprinted in Rosenthal (1991): 601, 12.
  • Coren, Stanley (1994) The Intelligence of Dogs: Canine Consciousness and Capabilities, New York: Scribner.
  • Crick, Francis (1994) The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul, New York: Scribner.

D

  • Danziger, Kurt (1980) “The History of Introspection Reconsidered,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 16: 241–62.
  • Davidson, Donald (1967) “Truth and Meaning,” Synthese 17: 304–23. Reprinted in Davidson (1984): 17–36.
  • Davidson, Donald (1973) “Radical Interpretation,” Dialectica 27: 313–28, Reprinted in Davidson (1984): 125–39.
  • Davidson, Donald (1974a) “Belief and the Basis of Meaning,” Synthese 27: 309–23, Reprinted in Davidson (1984): 141–54.
  • Davidson, Donald (1974b) “Psychology as Philosophy,” in S. C. Brown (ed), Philosophy of Psychology, New York: Barnes and Noble Books: 41–52, Reprinted in Davidson (1980): 231–9.
  • Davidson, Donald (1975) “Thought and Talk,” in Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language: Wolfson College Lectures 1974, Oxford: Clarendon Press: 7–23, Reprinted in Davidson (1984): 155–70.
  • Davidson, Donald (1977) “Reality without Reference,” Dialectica 31: 247–53, Reprinted in Davidson (1984): 215–25.
  • Davidson, Donald (1980) Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • Davidson, Donald (1984) Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • Davidson, Donald (1986) “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge,” in Lepore (1986): 307–19.
  • Dennett, Daniel (1987) The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
  • Dennett, Daniel (1991a) Consciousness Explained, Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown.
  • Dennett, Daniel (1991b) “Real Patterns,” Journal of Philosophy 89: 27–51.
  • Dennett, Daniel (1996) Kinds of Minds: Toward an Understanding of Consciousness, New York: Basic Books.
  • Dennett, Daniel and Hofstadter, Douglas (eds) (1981) The Mind’s I, New York: Basic Books.
  • Descartes, René (1641/1986) Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. John Cottingham, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Dretske, Fred (1988) Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
  • Dretske, Fred (1995) Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

E

  • Evnine, Simon (1991) Donald Davidson, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

F

  • Feigl, Herbert (1958) “The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’,” in H. Feigl, M. Scriven and G. Maxwell (eds) Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 370–497. Reissued in 1967 as a monograph, The “Mental” and the “Physical”, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
  • Fodor, Jerry (1975), The Language of Thought, New York: T. Y. Crowell.
  • Fodor, Jerry (1988) Psychosemantics, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
  • Fodor, Jerry (1991) “You Can Fool Some of the People All of the Time. Everything Else Being Equal: Hedged Laws and Psychological Explanation” Mind 100: 19–34.
  • Fodor, Jerry (1994) The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and its Semantics Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
  • Foster, John (1991) The Immaterial Self, London: Routledge.

G

  • Gopnik, Alison and Astington, J. W. (1988) “Children’s Understanding of Representational Change and its Relation to the Understanding of False Belief and the Appearance-Reality Distinction,” Child Development 59: 26–37.

H

  • Harman, Gilbert (1990) “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience,” Philosophical Perspectives 4: 31–52.
  • Haugeland, John (ed.) (1981a) Mind Design, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
  • Haugeland, John (1981b) “Semantic Engines: An Introduction to Mind Design,” in Haugeland (1981a): 1–34.
  • Haugeland, John (1985) Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
  • Heil, John (1983) Perception and Cognition, Berkeley: University of California Press.
  • Heil, John (1992) The Nature of True Minds, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Hobbes, Thomas (1651/1994) Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.
  • Horgan, T. (1993) “From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World,” Mind 102: 555–86.
  • Hume, David (1739/1978) A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • Hume, David (1748/1975) Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • Huxley, T. H. (1901) Methods and Results: Essays, New York: D. Appleton.

J

  • Jackson, Frank (1982) “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” The Philosophical Quarterly 32. 36–127:
  • Jackson, Frank (1996) “Mental Causation,” Mind 105: 377–41.

K

  • Kant, Immanuel (1787/1964) The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, London: Macmillan.
  • Kim, Jaegwon (1990) “Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept” Metaphilosophy 12: 1–27, Reprinted in Kim (1993): 131–60.
  • Kim, Jaegwon (1993) Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Kirk, G. S., Raven, J. E., and Schofield, M. (1983) The Presocratic Philosophers 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Kirk, Robert (1974) “Zombies vs. Materialists,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary vol. 48: 135–52.
  • Kirk, Robert (1996) Raw Feeling, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

L

  • La Mettrie, Julien Offraye de (1747 and 1748/1994) Man a Machine, trans. R. Watson and M. Rybalka, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.
  • Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1787/1973) Monadology, in Mary Morris and G. H. R Parkinson (trans.) and G. H. R. Parkinson (ed.), Leibniz: Philosophical Writings.
  • London: J. M. Dent and Sons: 179–94.
  • Lepore, Ernest (ed.) (1986) Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
  • Lepore, Ernest and Loewer, Barry (1987) “Mind Matters,” Journal of Philosophy. 42–630: 84.
  • Levine, Joseph (1983) “Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64: 354–61.
  • Lewis, David (1966) “An Argument for the Identity Theory,” Journal of Philosophy, 25–17: 63 Reprinted in Lewis (1983): 99–107.
  • Lewis, David (1972) “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50: 249–58. Reprinted in Block (1980a): 207–15; and in Rosenthal (1991): 204–10.
  • Lewis, David (1980) “Mad Pain and Martian Pain,” in Block (1980a): 216–22. Reprinted in Lewis (1983): 122–9; and in Rosenthal (1991): 229–35.
  • Lewis, David (1983) Philosophical Papers, vol. 1, New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Lewis, David (1994) “Reduction of Mind,” in Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Basil Blackwell: 412–31.
  • Locke, John (1690/1978) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • Lockwood, Michael (1989) Mind, Brain, and Quantum, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
  • Lockwood, Michael (1993) “The Grain Problem,” in H. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism, Oxford: Clarendon Press: 271–91.
  • Lowe, E. J. (1988) “Substance,” in G. H. R. Parkinson (ed.), An Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London: Routledge: 255–78.
  • Lowe, E. J. (1994) “Primitive Substances,” philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 531–52.
  • Lowe, E. J. (1995) Locke on Human Understanding, London: Routledge.
  • Lowe, E. J. (1996) Subjects of Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Lycan, W. G. (1987) Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

M

  • McKirahan, R. (1994) Philosophy Before Socrates: An Introduction with Texts and Commentary, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.
  • Malebranche, Nicholas (1688/1997) Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion trans. Nicholas Jolley and David Scott, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Martin, C. B. (1980) “Substance Substantiated,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58: 3–10.
  • Martin, C. B. (1987) “Proto-Language,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65: 277–89.
  • Martin, C. B. (1992) “Power for Realists,” in Bacon et al. (1992): 175–86.
  • Martin, C. B. (1993) “The Need for Ontology: Some Choices,” Philosophy 68: 505–22.
  • Martin, C. B. (1994) “Dispositions and Conditionals,” The Philosophical Quarterly. 1–8: 44
  • Martin, C. B. (1997) “On the Need for Properties: The Road to Pythagoreanism and Back,” Synthese 112: 193–231.
  • Martin, C. B. and Heil, John (forthcoming) “Rules and Powers,” Philosophical Perspectives.
  • Mele, Alfred R. (1987) Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control, New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Mellor, Hugh (1974) “In Defense of Dispositions,” Philosophical Review 83: 157–81. Reprinted in Mellor (1991): 104–22.
  • Mellor, Hugh (1991) Matters of Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Millikan, Ruth (1984) Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
  • Millikan, Ruth (1989) “Biosemantics,” Journal of Philosophy 86: 281–97.
  • Moses, Louis J. and Flavell, J. H. (1990) “Inferring False Beliefs from Actions and Reactions,” Child Development 61: 929–45.

N

  • Nagel, Thomas (1974) “What is it Like to be a Bat?” Philosophical Review 83: 435–50. Reprinted in Nagel (1979): 165–80. Also reprinted in Block (1980a): 159–68 and in Rosenthal (1991): 422–8.
  • Nagel, Thomas (1979) Mortal Questions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

P

  • Perner, Josef (1991) Understanding the Representational Mind, Cambridge. Mass.: MIT Press.
  • Place, U. T. (1956) “Is Consciousness A Brain Process?” The British Journal of Psychology 47: 44–50.
  • Plato, Parmenides, in B. Jowett (trans.), The Dialogues of Plato, 4th ed., vol. 2 Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953.
  • Plato, Phaedo, in B. Jowett (trans.), The Dialogues of Plato, 4th ed., vol. 1, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953.
  • Plato, Republic, in B. Jowett (trans.), The Dialogues of Plato, 4th ed., vol. 2, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953.
  • Poland, Jeffrey (1994) Physicalism: The Philosophical Foundations, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • Putnam, Hilary, (1975a) “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’,” in Keith Gunderson (ed) Language, Mind, and Knowledge (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 131–93. Reprinted in Putnam (1975b): 215–71.
  • Putnam, Hilary (1975b) Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers, vol 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Putnam, Hilary (1981) Reason, Truth, and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Pylyshyn, Zenon (1973) “What then Mind’s Eye Tells the Mind’s Brain: A Critique of Mental Imagery,” Psychological Bulletin 80: 1–25.

Q

  • Quine, W. V. O. (1961) Word and Object, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

R

  • Rosenthal, David (ed.) (1991) The Nature of Mind, New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Russell, Bertrand (1927) Analysis of Matter, London: Kegan Paul.
  • Ryder, D. T. (1996) “Evaluating Theories of Consciousness Using the Autonomic Nervous System for Comparison,” unpublished MA thesis, University of Calgary.
  • Ryle, Gilbert (1949) The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson.

S

  • Searle, John (1980) “Minds, Brains, and Programs,” Behavioral and Brain.
  • Sciences 3: 417–24. Reprinted in Haugeland (1981a): 282–306; in Dennett and Hofstadter (1981): 353–82; and in Rosenthal (1991): 509–23.
  • Searle, John (1992) The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
  • Searle, John (1997) “Consciousness and the Philosophers,” New York Review of Books, 6 March: 43–50.
  • Shoemaker, Sydney (1975) “Functionalism and Qualia,” Philosophical Studies, 315–27: 291 Reprinted in Block (1980a): 251–67; in Shoemaker (1984a): 184–205 and in Rosenthal (1991): 395–407.
  • Shoemaker, Sydney (1980) “Causality and Properties,” in Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Co.: 109–35. Reprinted in Shoemaker (1984a): 206–33.
  • Shoemaker, Sydney (1981) “Some Varieties of Functionalism,” Philosophical Topics 12: 83–118. Reprinted in Shoemaker (1984a): 261–86.
  • Shoemaker, Sydney (1984a) Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Shoemaker, Sydney (1984b) “Absent Qualis sre Impossible: A Reply to Block,” in Shoemaker (1984a): 309–26.
  • Skinner, B. F. (1953) Science and Human Behavior, New York: Macmillan.
  • Skinner, B. F. (1957) Verbal Behavior, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
  • Skinner, B. F. (1963) “Behaviorism at Fifty,” Science 140: 951–8. Reprinted with commentaries and Skinner’s responses in Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1984): 57–615.
  • Smart, J. J. C. (1959) “Sensations and Brain Processes,” Philosophical Review, 56–68: 141 Reprinted in Rosenthal (1991): 169–76.
  • Sterelny, Kim (1990) The Representational Theory of Mind: An Introduction Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
  • Stich, Stephen (1983) From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
  • Strawson, P. F. (1959) Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, London: Methuen.

T

  • Tarski, Alfred (1956) “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages,” in Logic Semantics, and Metamathematics, Oxford: Clarendon Press: 152–278.
  • Thomas, Elizabeth Marshall (1993) The Hidden Life of Dogs, New York: Houghton-Mifflin.
  • Thomas, Elizabeth Marshall (1994) The Tribe of the Tiger, New York: Simon and Schuster.
  • Thomas, Nigel J. T. (1989) “Experience and Theory as Determinants of Attitudes toward Mental Representation: The Case of Knight Dunlap and the Vanishing Images of J. B. Watson,” American Journal of Psychology 102: 395–412.
  • Thomas, Nigel J. T. (forthcoming) “Are Theories of Imagery Theories of Imagination?” Cognitive Science.
  • Tolman, E. C. (1948) “Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men,” Psychological Review, 55: 208–189.
  • Turing, Alan (1950) “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” Mind 59: 434–60. Reprinted in Dennett and Hofstadter (1981): 53–68; and in Anderson (1964): 4–30.
  • Tye, Michael (1991) The Imagery Debate, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

V

  • van Inwagen, Peter (1993) Metaphysics, Boulder: Westview Press.

W

  • Waal, F. B. M. de (1982) Chimpanzee Politics, New York: Harper and Row.
  • Watson, J. B. (1913) “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It,” Psychological Review 20: 158–77.
  • Weinberg, Steven (1997) “Before the Big Bang,” New York Review of Books, 12 June: 16–20.
  • Wimmer, Heinz and Perner, Josef (1983) “Beliefs about Beliefs: Representation and Constraining Function of Wrong Beliefs in Young Children’s Understanding of Deception,” Cognition 13: 103–28.
  • Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1922/1961) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F Pears and B. F. McGuinness, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
  • Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953/1968) Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
  • Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1969) On Certainty, eds G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von
  • Wright, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
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